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Abstract 
Islam’s positioning in relation to Western ideals of individuality, freedom, women’s rights 
and democracy has been an abiding theme of sociological analysis and cultural criticism, 
especially since September 11th 2001. Less attention has been paid, however, to another 
concept that has been central to the image of Western modernity: science. This article 
analyzes comments about Islam gathered over the course of 117 interviews and 13 focus 
groups with non-Muslim members of the public and scientists in the UK and Canada on the 
theme of the relationship between science and religion. The article shows how participants’ 
accounts of Islam and science contrasted starkly with their accounts of other religious 
traditions, with a notable minority of predominantly non-religious interviewees describing 
Islam as uniquely, and uniformly, hostile to science and rational thought. It highlights how 
such descriptions of Islam were used to justify the cultural othering of Muslims in the West 
and anxieties about educational segregation, demographic ‘colonization’ and Islamist 
extremism. Using these data, the article argues for: 1) wider recognition of how popular 
understandings of science remain bound up with conceptions of Western cultural 
superiority; and 2) greater attentiveness to how prejudices concerning Islamic beliefs help 
make the idea that Muslims pose a threat to the West respectable. 
Keywords: Science and Islam, science and religion, Islamophobia, racialization, non-religion 
Introduction 
In recent years, against the backdrop of the ‘War on Terror’, various authors (Massad, 2015; 
Norton, 2013) have shown how North American and European writers, past and present, 
have positioned concepts such as individualism, freedom, women’s rights and democracy in 
such a way as to externalize Islam and portray the tradition as representing everything the 
West stands against. Less attention has been paid, however, to another concept that has 
been central to the image of Western modernity: science. As with the political ideals above, 
claims about science have been prominent in Western writing on Islam. Nineteenth century 
orientalists such as Ernest Renan and E.H. Nolan dismissed Islam as guided by ‘fixed 
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principles’ that make it inherently hostile to scientific discoveries (Nolan, 1859: iv; Renan, 
2000 [1883]). More recently, too, ‘New Atheists’ and soi-disant spokespersons for science 
such as Sam Harris (2006) and Richard Dawkins (BBC, 2011) have singled out Islam as 
implacably opposed to scientific inquiry. The question of how science fits into the cultural 
identity of Western societies, and its role in influencing attitudes to Islam, has been, 
however, neglected. 
In this article, we analyze comments made about Islam over the course of 117 interviews 
and 13 focus groups with non-Muslim members of the public and professional scientists 
based in the UK and Canada on the subject of the relationship between religion and science. 
We show how participants’ accounts of Islam and science contrasted starkly with their 
accounts of other religious traditions, with a notable minority of predominantly non-
religious participants describing Islam as uniquely, and uniformly, hostile to science and 
rational thought. Using these data, we do two related things. First, we highlight the 
contemporary influence of narratives claiming that Islam’s ‘dogmatic’ nature puts it at odds 
with science and associated concepts such as ‘Enlightenment’, ‘reason’, and ‘modernity’. 
This allows us to show how science, as well as signifying a set of institutions and practices, 
functions as a label marking out social identities and boundaries. Second, we use our data to 
make an argument about the study of contemporary Islamophobia. While we draw upon 
recent scholarship on the racialization of Muslim identity, we criticize and take steps to 
remedy the lack of consideration given in this body of work to stereotypes about religious 
interpretation in Islam. We draw attention to the ways in which prejudices about belief and 
processes of racialization and cultural othering are intertwined. Further, we argue that 
being attentive to prejudices specifically about religious belief in Islam can shed light on the 
processes by which Islamophobia is made respectable.  
We begin by reviewing the emergence of Islamophobia as a concept and debates about it. 
Here, we contrast analysis of historical anti-Islamic sentiment with literature on 
contemporary Islamophobia, paying attention to the distinction developed in the latter 
between Islamophobia and ‘Muslimphobia’. We then introduce our research and give an 
overview of our findings, before providing a detailed account of the themes we encountered 
in participants’ negative accounts of Islam and Muslims. Although we show how our 
participants’ comments involved racialization and the othering of ‘Muslim culture’, we also 
highlight how prejudices about interpretation in Islam were central to participants’ negative 
judgements. We analyze the social role of such prejudices, before concluding with an 
argument about the need to integrate insights about religious interpretation into 
scholarship on anti-Muslim prejudice. 
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Islamophobia, past and present 
Islamophobia is simultaneously a very old and a very new phenomenon. The word itself was 
introduced into the Anglophone lexicon only in the 1980s (Vakil, 2010: 33), becoming 
mainstream following the attacks of September 11th 2001. Those who popularized the 
concept, however, recognized that it described ‘centuries old’ hostilities (CBMI, 1997). 
Accordingly, recent collections on the subject (M. Malik, 2010; Meer, 2016; Sayyid and Vakil, 
2010) contain fruitful analysis of both historical and contemporary perceptions. Historical 
work has tended to focus on the ways Muslims and Islam have been depicted in Western 
literary, philosophical and political writing (Anidjar, 2003; Massad, 2015),1 while research 
into contemporary Islamophobia has been concerned with negative public perceptions of 
Muslims (Bleich, 2009), attacks on them (Allen et al., 2013) and legislative and policy 
responses to these problems (Meer, 2010). With interest in the concept being spurred by 
the ‘War on Terror’, analysis of contemporary trends has, understandably, been dominated 
by the impact of securitization on Muslims’ rights and engagement with Western states 
(Hussain and Bagguley, 2012; Saeed, 2016). 
There are important continuities between these two literatures. The racialization of Islam 
and the exoticization of Muslim women, for example, are conspicuous themes throughout, 
showing that, while Islamophobia today operates through novel governance logics and 
technologies of control (Hussain and Bagguley, 2012), past cultural norms continue to echo 
in and influence the present. Questions of belief tend, however, to be treated differently 
depending on whether historical or contemporary prejudice is the subject of discussion. 
When focusing on historical depictions of Islam, scholars have found space to discuss 
perceptions of religious interpretation. An important analytical theme has been historical 
writers’ accounts of the way Christianity and Islam relate to modernity, Enlightenment and 
‘the secular’ (Asad, 1993; Massad, 2015).2 Authors such as Derrida (2002) and Anidjar (2003, 
2006) have persuasively argued that Enlightenment-era Western writers, historians and 
philosophers commonly depicted Christianity as, at one and the same time, the opponent of 
secular, enlightened rationalism and as the tradition that contained the seeds of rational 
inquiry and thus made secularity and Enlightenment possible.3 They point to how 
Christianity came to be regarded as, in Kant’s (1958 [1793]) terms, a ‘reflecting’, potentially 
reasonable intellectual tradition embedded in Western culture, in contrast to Jewish and 
Islamic ‘dogmatisms’ that were seen as external and alien to it. Their argument, in short, is 
that during the process of Christianity in the West becoming secularized the distinction 
between secular and religious, and in turn between rational and non-rational, became 
intertwined with the production of Western culture and its others.   
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This contrast between Christianity and Islam (which we will see repeated in our interviews 
below) enables stereotypes about Muslims’ beliefs to form an important theme of analysis 
and critique. In scholarship on historical Islamophobia, consideration is given to how 
depictions of others’ religious beliefs as well as racial classifications facilitated the 
characterization of non-European populations as ‘uncontrollable’ and ‘fanatical’. A limited 
amount of space has even been given to scrutiny of claims by historical Western writers 
about Islam’s influence upon science (Lyons, 2014: 73–111; Massad, 2015: 39–42), with the 
dismissive portrayals of Renan and others being contrasted with figures, such as John W. 
Draper (Yalcinkaya, 2011), who spoke positively about scientific advances during Islam’s 
Abbasid-era ‘Golden Age’ (another trope that emerges in our interviews). In scholarship on 
contemporary Islamophobia, however, this consideration of stereotypes about belief 
diminishes. Beyond Said’s (1997 [1981]) pioneering analysis of portrayals of ‘Islamic 
fundamentalism’ in the 1980s, writing on contemporary Islamophobia has involved 
remarkably little discussion of prejudices about the nature of Muslims’ beliefs. 
Contemporary public perceptions of religious interpretation in Islam, and by extension of 
the tradition’s relationship with concepts such as ‘science’, ‘modernity’, and ‘rationality’, 
have therefore been sorely neglected. 
Racialization and religion 
This neglect is at least in part the consequence of how the debate about Islamophobia has 
played out since the term was popularized. Journalists on the liberal left as well as the right 
have repeatedly called Islamophobia’s status as prejudice into question, describing it as a 
‘myth’ (K. Malik, 2005) and a ‘nonsense’ (Toynbee, 2005). Such claims have generally been 
based on the argument that Islam is a system of ideas to which people choose to subscribe 
and is, therefore, distinct from socially or biologically determined characteristics such as 
‘race’ and gender that deserve legal protection. In stronger versions, this extends to 
claiming that protection against Islamophobia – through legislation outlawing incitement to 
religious hatred, for example – presents risks to free speech and amounts to a ‘capitulation 
to Muslim extremism’ (for an overview see Meer, 2010: 181–183). 
Against such opposition, those seeking to win recognition for Islamophobia have typically, 
and understandably, emphasized the socialized nature of Muslim identity. In some cases, 
this extends to dispensing with the term ‘Islamophobia’ entirely and proffering alternatives 
such as ‘Muslimphobia’ or ‘anti-Muslimism’ (for a summary see Cheng, 2015: 564). Halliday 
(1999: 898), for example, justified such a substitution on the basis that ‘[t]he attack now is 
against not Islam as a faith but Muslims as a people’ (original emphasis). Central to this 
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substitution is the insight that Islam was historically, and remains today, racially coded. In 
many national contexts, within and indeed beyond the West, being Muslim is associated 
with ethnic group membership and thus with certain somatic characteristics (Moosavi, 
2015: 44). Imagery denigrating Islam, moreover, has often utilized somatic tropes such as 
the ‘bulbous nose and bushy eyebrows’ familiar from the history of anti-Semitism in Europe 
(Levey and Modood, 2009: 439). Such arguments suggest an understanding of Islamophobia 
as racism that merely presents itself as religious criticism. The switch in terminology, then, 
allows the debate around religious prejudice to be bypassed, with discourse kept in terms 
familiar to scholars of race and ethnicity. 
This approach sits alongside a second, and we argue more helpful, response that seeks not 
to bypass the religious aspects of Islamophobia but incorporate these within theories of 
cultural racism and racialization (Massoumi et al., 2017; Meer, 2016; Modood, 1997). Here, 
too, Muslim identity is understood not just as a matter of agreeing with certain ideas but as 
a ‘quasi-ethnic sociological formation’ (Meer, 2008: 66). In this case, however, religion and 
race are treated similarly: just as ‘race’ is conceived of as a social construction within which 
‘certain ethnic heritage or cultural practices attach to social advantage and disadvantage’ 
(Massoumi et al., 2017: 5), so Islamophobia is seen as advantage and disadvantage rooted in 
perceived attachment to religious beliefs or communities. The racialized nature of 
Islamophobia is acknowledged, but in this literature greater emphasis is placed on the 
argument that racism does not always involve claims about biology. Stereotypes about 
British South Asians, for example, have rarely referred to biological inferiority but instead 
have usually involved claims about their being culturally alien (Modood, 1997). Such 
stereotypes are rightly regarded in Britain as racist, if for no other reason than they have 
been used to justify physical attacks (‘Paki-bashing’). Similar non-biological stereotypes have 
been applied to Muslims (‘terrorists’, ‘sexual predators’), along with associated abuse. 
Indeed, one of the strongest arguments for this manner of understanding Islamophobia is 
that there is a clear relationship between street-level abuse of Muslims and wearing visible 
signs of belief (Meer, 2013: 503; Meer and Modood, 2009: 74). This helps account for the 
fact that abuse of Muslims, unusually for racialized harassment, disproportionately affects 
women rather than men, particularly women who wear a hijab or niqab (Allen et al., 2013). 
What is striking, however, is that even scholars who take this second approach have said 
little about misrecognition of Muslims’ beliefs. Massoumi et al (2017) analyse how the social 
movements that popularize Islamophobia act in the pursuit of specific material interests, 
and explicitly distinguish their work from ‘ideas-based approaches’. Meer and Modood’s 
work does stress that Islamophobia has religious components, but their main focus is the 
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projection of racial and cultural themes onto religion. Indeed, their work points away from 
questions of belief at times, arguing that religious discrimination ‘does not usually proceed 
on the basis of belief but on the perceived membership of an ethno-religious group’ (Meer 
and Modood, 2010: 83). These authors’ conceptualization of Islamophobia requires, we 
argue, no re-working to be able to incorporate belief-based prejudices: within this 
framework, Islamophobia could involve, inter alia, the projection of beliefs, traditions and 
forms of interpretation onto people who are, or are perceived to be, Muslim. Neither group 
of authors disagrees in principle, too, with analyzing claims about Muslims’ beliefs (indeed, 
both have hinted such work is potentially important: Massoumi et al., 2017: 6; Meer and 
Modood, 2009: 353). Nevertheless, there is a tendency in this body of scholarship – 
exemplified by Runnymede’s recent efforts to cement an agreed definition of Islamophobia 
(Elahi and Khan, 2017) – to neglect belief. We want to propose that, while this may facilitate 
public recognition of more extreme manifestations of Islamophobia, it comes at the cost of 
neglecting subtler, socially acceptable prejudices. Further, it hinders the potentially forceful 
argument that, whatever one’s views concerning freedom to criticize religious ideas, 
stereotypes about the beliefs people hold do exist and can be damaging. 
The present study, then, proposes to build on the work of these authors to bring scholarship 
on racialization into contact with data dealing explicitly with religious interpretation. In what 
follows, we connect historical and sociological literatures on Islamophobia by examining 
how discourses about Islam’s ‘irrational’ and ‘anti-science’ nature appear in the interview 
narratives of non-Muslim scientists and publics in the West. Science, we show, has force as 
an identity marker and is mobilized in anti-Muslim narratives that touch on themes of race, 
immigration and social cohesion. The philosophical theme of our interviews also means that 
our data shed light on how prejudices about belief and processes of racialization are 
intertwined. In the sections below, we will show not only that stereotypes of belief and 
racialization work together, but that that the former follow distinctive social dynamics that 
deserve closer attention. 
Research methods 
The research this article is based on was carried out between 2014 and 2017 as part of the 
multi-disciplinary project ‘Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum’. This project’s goal 
was to investigate how debates about, and perceptions of, science and religion are socially 
situated. Drawing on an emerging, predominantly USA-based body of sociological 
scholarship on science and religion (see, inter alia, Ecklund, 2010; Hill, 2014; Noy and 
O’Brien, 2016), the research investigates variations in how science and religion are 
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understood in different national contexts and (non-)religious groups. A central theme in the 
research is, then, analyzing how philosophical and scriptural interpretations intersect with, 
and are influenced by, social processes and conflicts. The qualitative social scientific strand 
of this project included 123 interviews and 16 focus groups with members of the public and 
scientists working in the life, biological and medical sciences (see Table 1).4 We selected 
approximately the same number of religious as non-religious participants5 and, beyond this, 
chose participants purposively to ensure variation in terms of belief, age, class, gender and 
ethnicity (see Emmel, 2013). In the case of interviews and focus groups with the public, 
recruitment was facilitated by a pre-screening survey that enabled targeted selection. 
 Scientists  Public 
UK interviews 20 41 (4) 
Canada interviews 22 40 (2) 
UK focus groups 3  5 (2) 
Canada focus groups  3 5 (1) 
Table 1: Interviews and focus groups (brackets indicate Muslim/ex-Muslim cases excluded 
from this analysis) 
Interviews covered participants’ (non-)religious formation, interest in science, views about 
science and religion, attitudes toward evolution, and perceptions of public coverage of 
science and religion. We did not ask participants their views of Islam directly, but questions 
were designed to elicit opinions of ‘religion in general’ and of outgroups (for example: ‘Can 
you recall an occasion where you learned about how people with beliefs different from your 
own understand evolutionary science?’). In this article we focus upon non-Muslims’ 
comments about Islam, so we have excluded three focus groups and six interviews including 
Muslims or ex-Muslims. 
Interviews and focus groups were semi-structured, following a schedule common to the UK 
and Canada that enabled participants the leeway to elaborate their views. This flexible 
structure was designed to give participants scope to draw associations between themes 
(Wengraf, 2009). In the USA, people’s views on science and religion are associated with 
positions on a range of moral issues, from gender and sexuality to families, schools and 
human life (Noy and O’Brien, 2016). Acknowledging this, we sought to explore how people’s 
beliefs about religion and evolution – and science and religion more generally – mapped 
onto other issues. As we shall see, interviewees moved rapidly from subjects like science, 
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rationalism and religious interpretation to socio-political themes including education, 
demographic change, and religion’s place in public life. 
Overview of findings 
All the interviews and focus groups were transcribed and analyzed using the qualitative data 
analysis package QSR NVivo. Across all transcripts, including those we excluded, there were 
904 references to Islam and Muslims across 106 interviews and focus groups. These were 
coded, once Muslim/ex-Muslim participants and interviewers’ comments had been 
removed, into 256 extended passages across 91 interviews and focus groups. All 
interviewees and focus groups were classified on a seven point scale ranging from negative 
to positive about Islam and Muslims in order to facilitate systematic comparisons (using 
matrix data queries) across religious, national and professional lines. 
Given our purposive sampling strategy and indirect questioning, we cannot make 
generalizable claims regarding the prevalence of negative attitudes toward Islam and/or 
Muslims amongst British or Canadian populations. Nevertheless, a clear qualitative 
distinction emerged from our data between how participants discussed Islam and how they 
discussed other religious traditions. It was extremely rare for participants to single out 
traditions other than Islam and Christianity as being incompatible with ‘scientific inquiry’. In 
the case of other minority religions, participants were generally willing to acknowledge their 
lack of knowledge, while Islam’s nature was considered by many to be well-known. 
Moreover, as we shall illustrate below, in the case of Christianity our participants were 
generally willing to accept that there is variation within the tradition and that the Bible 
offers flexibility of interpretation in a way they were not for Islam and the Qur’an. 
Participants who were negatively disposed to ‘religion’ as a category did associate 
Christianity with suspension of critical reasoning, but it was extremely rare for participants 
to claim that being Christian necessarily and uniformly involved such suspension, or to claim 
that Christianity is dangerous as well as irrational. 
Across the 91 interviews and focus groups, the number coded negative (1-3) and positive (5-
7) was similar (26 and 25, respectively).6 This equivalence, however, needs to be treated 
carefully. Among those coded as positive towards Islam and Muslims, comments were 
generally limited to acknowledging that Muslims suffer racism or that there is diversity 
within the Islamic tradition. Positive comments about the content of the tradition – for 
example, the claim that Islam forms part of the ‘Western canon’ or that the Qur’an ‘contains 
beauty’ – were extremely rare. We go into detail about the character of the negative 
accounts below, but suffice to note here that these overwhelmingly involved claims about 
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the nature of Islamic belief. Most negative accounts of Islam were offered by members of 
the general public rather than scientists (see Table 2). Our study thus found little evidence 
to suggest that knowledge of science encourages anti-Islamic views. Consistent with findings 
from USA-based scholarship on science and religion (Evans, 2011; Hill, 2014), taking a 
position on science and Islam appeared to have more to do with identity and moral 
positioning than familiarity with scientific concepts. There were also limited differences 
observed between the two country contexts, reflecting the fact that, while the present 
Canadian government has a comparatively open stance concerning immigration, Islam-
related moral panics have occurred in both nation-states. 
Professional status General public Scientist 
20 (24.4%) 6 (12.5%) 
Nationality UK Canada 
15 (23.8%) 11 (16.4%) 
Belief Religious Non-religious 
8 (11.4%) 18 (29.5%) 
Table 2: Frequency of cases including negative accounts of Islam (percentage of all non-
Muslim cases in brackets) 
Most striking were the differences between religious and non-religious participants. Studies 
of what factors predict hostility toward Muslims in Europe are not conclusive on the 
question of whether (non-)religion predicts anti-Muslim views. Strabac and Listhaug’s (2008) 
analysis of European Values Study data found little connection between religious practice 
and attitudes toward Muslims. Using a multilevel model based on data on belief, values and 
identity from the same survey, however, Ribberink et al. (2017) found a consistent 
relationship between non-religiosity and anti-Muslim sentiment, as well as increased 
solidarity with Muslims among Protestants. Our indicative findings resonate with this latter 
study. Negative accounts of Islam were almost three times as likely to be found in interviews 
and focus groups with non-religious participants as religious non-Muslim participants. 
Similarly, positive accounts of Islam and Muslims were more than twice as likely to be found 
in interviews and focus groups with religious non-Muslim participants as non-religious 
participants. There were exceptions: in our sample the most positive comments about the 
Qur’an’s beauty were made by the leader of a humanist network. In general, however, the 
view that Islam is inimical to science was predominantly non-religious, while many Christian 
participants emphasized the commonality between religions. Research in the field of non-
religion studies has observed that science is central to the moral identities of some non-
religious individuals (Catto and Eckles, 2013; Lee, 2015). In our research with non-religious 
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people, science emerged not just as central to identity but as a concept through which 
difference was expressed and boundaries maintained. 
Negative orientations toward Islam 
We turn now to look at the negative accounts of Islam in our interviews and focus groups. 
We begin by looking at how racialization and cultural othering featured in our interviews. 
We then move on to examine the process of exceptionalization in our interview and focus 
group data. By this, we mean narratives used to mark Islam out as uniquely irrational or 
threatening. As we shall see, there numerous ways in which Islam was exceptionalized by 
participants, but underlying almost all these were claims or assumptions about Islam’s 
supposed interpretive inflexibility. The idea that Islam leaves no room for individual 
reasoning was a common thread in the negative accounts of Islam in our data, and we 
suggest that the way this thread was tied into racialized claims (or not) holds lessons for 
understanding Islamophobia. 
Racialization and cultural othering 
Above, we referred to three related forms of prejudice: 1) biological racism involving claims 
about somatic characteristics; 2) cultural racism involving non-biological claims about 
cultural inferiority; and 3) religious prejudice involving claims about the beliefs people hold. 
All of these types of claim were made at some point in our study. A minority (5) of 
participants expressed themes familiar from far-Right discourses: prophecies of a violent 
confrontation with Islam or predictions about the ‘demographic colonization’ of Europe by 
Muslims. For example, Cliff (all pseudonyms), a White British non-religious member of the 
public, saw conflict with Islam as inexorable: 
[Islam is] the enemy of everything. It’s the enemy. And we’re just blindly wandering 
into it. We’re not hanging on to the insights of Enlightenment, which to me is the 
primacy of reason over dogma. We’re turning our backs on that, and it’s absolutely 
terrifying. I’m not sure what’s going to happen.  
In interviews where biological or cultural claims were prominent, interviewees sometimes 
distinguished explicitly between ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ threats. Natascha, for example, a 
White Canadian non-religious member of the public, described ‘Muslim culture’ in highly 
racialized terms and as separate from ‘religion’: 
[S]ome societies, and it’s particularly Muslim populations, some of them are in 
Pakistan, some of them are in India […] the inbreeding […] first cousins are marrying 
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each other, and it’s causing […] birth defects and so on, but these people are 
actually worshipping these, I don’t even know if you can call them humans at that 
point, as a sign of God […]. In some areas of the world, and particularly in Islamic 
countries, it’s not just religion; it’s culture. 
A similar distinction was made by Abigail, another White Canadian non-religious member of 
the public. In her case, a gendered narrative of violent Muslim/Western confrontation was 
described as cultural conflict and not scriptural: 
Why cover your face? We’re not a country who walks around in masks. And also 
don’t tell me you’re doing it because of your faith because the Muslim faith there’s 
nothing about covering their face. And, as I said, and always makes me wonder, 
well, if you’re that strict of a Muslim that you’re going even over and above what 
your own doctrine tells you to do then I guess you want to kill all of us infidels too, 
and that’s pretty frightening to me. 
Despite these examples, however, our data did not support the premise that Islamophobia 
is predominantly a matter of ethno-cultural or racialized difference with questions of belief 
being of little significance. The much more common tendency in our data was for narratives 
about cultural difference to be tightly interwoven with, indeed based upon, narratives about 
philosophical difference. Claims about philosophical differences between religious and 
secular traditions were used as explanations of social trends or as justifications for fears 
emerging within spaces of encounter (especially, as we shall see, schools). The following 
exchange, for example, took place in a focus group with ten non-religious members of the 
public in London. All participants were White British, as were the facilitators (one facilitator 
was Muslim, although this was not disclosed to participants).7 The conversation began by 
focusing on the theme of scientific progress, with one participant’s optimistic comment on 
the subject being challenged by three others: 
Participant 1: [I’m optimistic about the future because] I like to see it [history] as 
leaving ignorance and prejudice and bigotry behind us. 
Participant 2: But it [ignorance] may not continue to depreciate… 
Participant 3: No, I agree. 
Participant 2: Because as demographics change I believe the birth rate amongst 
religious families is higher. But there is a sense that… 
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Participant 1: Except that the experience of this country is that they start to 
conform to the kind of patterns that the rest of us conform to… 
Participant 2: I don't… 
Participant 4: I'm not sure that's true. 
Participant 3: It's true about the number of religious groups, but I think there may 
be something about Islamic groups which is different.  
The conversation continued, with Participant 4 eventually concluding with the following: 
Just sitting in King's Cross Station […], all the headscarves suddenly appear. I think, 
am I imagining this? But that says to me that something very, very dangerous is 
happening in this society. The danger is coming from Islam. 
Clearly, this passage involves the construction of cultural others (‘the headscarves suddenly 
appear’) while biological themes are alluded to more subtly (‘the birth rate amongst 
religious families is higher’). Here as elsewhere in our data, however, ‘Islam’ is not just 
invoked as a group label but is positioned as an ideology whose influence explains certain 
phenomena. It is this process of linking culture, ‘race’ and ideology that we wish to examine 
now, with reference to Islamic exceptionalism. 
The exceptionality of Islam 
The exceptionalization of Islam was a central theme not just in the conversation above but 
across the negative accounts. Participants bracketed Islam off from other religions, from 
general social trends, and from ostensibly universal moral principles or standards for 
evaluating evidence. Such comments were often curt and stated as a simple, uncontested 
matter of fact, as the following quotations illustrate: 
I think most of the religions of the world, as I understand them – you know, apart 
from Islam, that’s different – but apart from that, you know, we've got to treat 
people kindly and gently and lovingly.  
Lyle, White British Christian, public 
I think when science has such a, kind of, a set in stone explanation for something, 
it’s certainly hard to ignore, so I think for any religion, I can see them being fairly 
open-minded in taking [evolution] into account – maybe certain religions [don’t], 
for example, Islam […]. 
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Rebeccah, White British Christian, public 
In some instances, this exceptionalizing of Islam did not entail dividing the tradition from 
other religions, but rather seeing it as the exemplary case of ‘religion’. This was a frequent 
theme particularly in the narratives of non-religious people, some of whom saw Islam as 
religion in its ‘purest’, undiluted form: 
I think they’re all pretty much the same. They’re all, and Muslim is a little bit worse 
than most, I think, it’s proving at the minute. But, I think [all religions], they’ve all 
basically got the ingredients, they’ve got the ingredients for good but unfortunately 
most of, a lot of the time it’s used for evil, isn’t it?  
Norman, White British non-religious, public 
Islam, Christianity and ‘Western culture’ 
This exceptionalization of Islam also implied the externalization of Islam. Various narratives 
situated Islam and Muslim communities outside of ‘Western’ (or a particular national) 
culture while placing other religious traditions within it. For example, although, as we have 
seen, Judaism has also historically figured in European narratives of religious dogmatism, in 
our study most interviewees who mentioned the tradition portrayed it as having 
‘rationalized’.8 Similarly, Christianity was understood by participants to be, today, typically 
accommodating of empirical evidence, modern social mores and liberal political norms. 
Christian opposition to evolution was discussed regularly, but was generally depicted by 
religious and non-religious participants as a limited, predominantly USA-based 
phenomenon. Christianity was described as part of – and sometimes an ultimately positive 
influence on – the West. As one non-religious Canadian focus group participant put it: ‘I 
cannot believe that you can divorce the whole influence of Christianity and Western culture 
[on human rights], for example, for women. You just can't’.  
In contrast, Islamic opposition to science was typically viewed as comprehensive. The 
notable exception to this in our negative accounts were occasional narratives that talked of 
– in the words of Stuart, a White British non-religious member of the public – the ‘flowering 
of Arabic science under the Caliphate’. For some (religious) participants these ‘Golden Age’ 
narratives formed part of an argument against the idea of a general conflict between 
science and religion. For others, however, they fed into a view of the Islamic tradition as 
having driven out Greek rationalist influences following the Abbasid era and subsequently 
declined. Stuart, for example, spoke elsewhere of Muslims as people who want to ‘bring 
back’ punishments 'we got rid of […] a long time ago’. Such narratives of irrationalism, in 
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turn, led to Muslims being positioned as threatening. The following comments, for instance, 
draw a distinction between Christians’ and Muslims’ orientations toward science education. 
These quotes illustrate not just how the two traditions were contrasted in our research, but 
also how comments about Islam and science segued into discussions of social conflict: 
You know, the Tory government think that Christianity is the default religion in this 
country and that, therefore, if you open up schooling to interest groups, lo and 
behold, you will get lots and lots of nice Christian schools with lots of nice Christian 
values and family values, and whatever they mean by that. Of course, you're going 
to get radical Muslim schools.  
Kaye, White British non-religious, public 
Leaving aside the Catholic school system which seemed to be doing a better job at 
teaching evolution, the public school system is under pressure from Muslim parents 
and parents who really don’t want their religious ideas undermined by 
schoolteachers.  
Non-religious focus group participant, Canada 
Scriptural determinism 
Narratives of cultural othering, then, pervaded our negative accounts of Islam. In almost all 
cases, however, these were rationalized via claims about the absence of interpretive 
variation in Islam. Such claims often explicitly referred to the Qur’an and were offered as 
the basis for claims about Muslims’ alleged rejection of evolution, radicalism, educational 
segregation and demographic ‘colonization’. The following quotes – the first returning to 
the case of Cliff, then two further cases – illustrate: 
I mean, what seems to be happening is, that people are deciding that Allah means 
exactly what he says. He’s not being symbolic. When he says, chop their heads off, 
he means chop their heads off […]. [Some people say] that needs a good 
interpretation […] [But] who are they to presume to interpret, that when Allah says 
this, he doesn’t mean it? 
Cliff, White British non-religious, public 
I think my understanding is the Qur’an was literally handed down and there's not, I 
mean, that is Allah’s words. And there’s just no messing with interpretation. So 
theological discussion is very limited. It can be in that situation, that's my 
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understanding, and the Christian tradition and Judaeo-Christian tradition, I mean, 
there's a lot of latitude for discussion.  
Ronald, White Canadian Christian, scientist 
It starts with, okay, the truth is in the Bible so we need to go and follow the Bible; it 
can’t be challenged in some people’s mind. And I know that’s a very simplistic view 
of Christianity but as far as Islam goes that’s how Muslims are required to view the 
world, the way […] it was written down 1,300, 1,400 years ago […].  
Bryan, White British non-religious, public  
More than just offering a ‘monolithic’ account of Islam (CBMI, 1997), these narratives 
provide examples of what Appiah (2016) calls ‘scriptural determinism’: the assumption that 
a religious scripture determines its followers’ worldviews uniformly and can be used as an 
explanation for specific actions and (real or perceived) social changes. On this view, 
stereotypes about Muslims are valid because they are enclosed by a rigid philosophical 
framework.  
‘Dinner table’ prejudice 
Two questions follow from these observations. First, to what extent can these statements 
be counted as prejudiced? The analogy between religion and race, utilized in scholarship on 
the racialization of Islam, seems to break down insofar as, while all judgements on the basis 
of ‘race’ can be described as prejudiced, the same cannot necessarily be said for claims 
about knowledge traditions. The Qur’an is conventionally considered by Muslims as the 
revealed word of God, and has a form quite different from the Bible. In the case of Muslims’ 
beliefs about evolution, referred to earlier, there is scant empirical research but religiously 
justified evolution rejection does occur among Muslim populations, even if levels vary 
greatly (Clément, 2015). Yet, if this rules out the idea that all negative evaluations of these 
phenomena are prejudiced, we do still see the specific claims above in this way – and not 
just because they may be embedded in narratives of race and culture. Rather, these claims’ 
ignorance of the array of centuries old interpretive and contextualizing techniques in 
Qur’anic exegesis, as well as their unhesitating and unreflexive form, makes them 
prejudiced about the Islamic tradition itself.  
Second, what is the status of these claims about religious interpretation? Should we regard 
them as religious prejudice, or as masks for prejudices rooted in constructions of racial 
otherness, as advocates of terms such as ‘Muslimphobia’ seem to imply? To argue one way 
or the other here seems, to us, not just captious but to risk undermining the idea that both 
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categories are socially constructed (Massoumi et al., 2017). More productive is to examine 
when, and by whom, different claims are made. As we have already noted, claims about 
biology and far-right themes were rare in our interviews. Assumptions about literalism in 
Islam, however, permeated our data more deeply. Furthermore, such assumptions cut 
across differences in class, education and, in particular, political positioning. Hostile 
comments about Muslims as a group tended to be made by people who had radical 
libertarian (Cliff) or anti-élite (Lyle) political views. Generalizations about interpretation in 
Islam, in contrast, could be encountered across political positions, including positions 
committed to equality. Indeed, some participants expressed concern about the hostility to 
which Muslims are presently subjected while at the same time affirming a scriptural 
determinist reading of Islam. The clearest case of this was Bryan, quoted above. Bryan 
combined highly stereotyped views on what Muslims are ‘required to believe’ with the 
following, in response to a question about prejudice toward communities of belief: 
Muslims are categorised as having a broadly similar view of the world which is just 
nonsense as well, and I think that definitely is a problem in this country. 
This was an obvious case but can be taken to represent many of the ‘soft’ negative accounts 
of Islam we encountered in which an outward commitment to tolerance of Muslims as 
people coexisted with the view that Islam can only be followed uniformly and literalistically. 
Many of those who did not come close to using racialized language nevertheless, in their 
deterministic reading of interpretation in Islam, affirmed the underlying basis for the 
argument that Muslims pose a threat. This finding calls to mind the Conservative British 
politician Baroness Sayeeda Warsi’s (2011) claim that Islamophobia has ‘passed the dinner 
table test’ – or now extends beyond political extremes into contexts of middle class 
domestic respectability. This is, indeed, what our research suggested, but in an importantly 
qualified way: outright hostility toward Muslims as people was more restricted, while 
scriptural determinist narratives about Islam, which are not subject to the same public 
criticism, were widespread and offered unselfconsciously. With religion not being subject to 
the same censure as explicit remarks about ‘race’, narratives about Islam as faith emerged 
as a form of ‘acceptable’ anxiety about Muslims.  
Conclusion 
We propose, then, that examining popular constructions of ‘science’ and ‘rationality’ raises 
questions not only about how certain cultural narratives sustain Islamophobia, but also 
about the structuring of Islamophobic sentiment. These questions, moreover, have political 
implications as well as implications for the sociological discipline, and we want to consider 
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these in conclusion. One of the things that the research presented here highlights is that 
popular understandings of science remain influenced by longstanding narratives about 
Western cultural superiority, and that these narratives are, today, often articulated in 
specifically anti-Islamic terms. Unfortunately, however, within sociology scarcely has this 
insight been discussed even in directly relevant fields. Within the public understanding of 
science, for example, empirical analysis has tended to analyze religion simply as a potential 
driver of rejection of science (Elsdon-Baker, 2015). The contemporary role of ‘science’ in 
identity construction and boundary maintenance has been left to the nascent, rather 
isolated field of non-religion studies. Such work, we suggest, needs to be expanded in order 
to develop a fuller picture of the uses of science in society. 
As well as this, our research strongly suggests that claims about interpretation in Islam can 
act as a respectable way of articulating unease about Muslims. In much the same way that 
Western media may promote a racialized understanding of European history and identity 
while at the same time condemning racism, our participants made vast generalizations 
about interpretation in Islam that implied Muslims are a social threat while also denouncing 
anti-Muslim discrimination. The uncovering of such subtle and normalized means of 
racialization and cultural othering has been one of the central functions of racial and ethnic 
studies, yet the absence of consideration given to religious interpretation in this field means 
that the dynamic we have explored here has been largely ignored. This suggests, then, a 
need for sociologies of race and religion to work more collaboratively. At the 
methodological level, this might mean incorporating lines of questioning about belief within 
research instruments designed to track prejudice, or analysis of claims about religious belief 
in made in justification of racialized political norms. At the political level, it also means 
engaging more directly with the argument that Islamophobia should be opposed not just 
because Muslim identity is rarely wholly voluntary, but also because even voluntarily chosen 
beliefs can be misrepresented in prejudiced, potentially harmful ways. 
                                                     
Notes 
1 This includes the shifting terminology used to construct Muslim populations, of course (for 
example, ‘Turks’, ‘Moors’, ‘Mohammedans’, etc.). 
2 This work follows in the vein of Said’s Orientalism (1979) but, importantly, maintains that 
Said failed to recognize how the religious/secular distinction has facilitated the denigration 
of non-European peoples (see Anidjar, 2006; Vakil, 2010: 26–7). 
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3 This is not just an historical narrative but the thesis of contemporary authors such as 
Taylor (2007) and Lilla (2007), with some, such as popular historian Holland (2009), 
developing the theme to argue that Islam stands at odds with liberal principles. 
4 UK interviews and focus groups were concentrated in the North West and West Midlands 
of England. Canadian interviews were mainly limited to the Greater Toronto Area.  
5 Of course, this division is crude and masks significant differences in our sample in terms of 
levels of practice, strength of belief and manner of identification. Full details of our 
classification method are available on request. 
6 The remaining 40 involved innocuous comments about Islam and were coded as neutral 
(4). 
7 Interviewers/facilitators did not disclose their beliefs to interviewees unless asked. With 
this one exception, all interviewers and facilitators were Christian or agnostic and White 
British/German. 
8 In observing this we do not wish to imply that anti-Semitism is a lesser problem today than 
Islamophobia, merely that it is not expressed in terms of religion and science. For 
comparisons of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia see Meer (2013) and Meer and Noorani 
(2008). 
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